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European UnionRecent political and military events in Ukraine have brought into sharp focus concerns over the
security of European gas supplies from Russia. At the same time, the creation of an infrastructural
and political ‘energy union’ has become a key stated priority for the governing bodies of the
European Union. Both contingencies have highlighted the 28-nation bloc’s dependence on energy
sources well beyond its state boundaries, underpinned by the existence of a transnational network
for the transport and distribution of natural gas. We develop a theoretical framework predicated upon
assemblage and governance approaches to explore the regulatory practices and spatial features
associated with this hitherto largely unexplored infrastructural realm. Qualitative evidence from
interviews, policy documents and media reports is interrogated interpretively and with the aid of
social network analysis techniques. The paper reveals the existence of a socio-technical assemblage
for the transmission of natural gas across national boundaries emerging as a result of the erosion
of decision-making power away from established state actors, and the rise of new institutional orders.
While undermining the organizational arrangements that have traditionally dominated the European
gas sector, these contingencies also challenge existing understandings of transnational energy
governance as they apply to overland gas transit.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
As evidenced by concerns over European gas supply as a result
of the crisis in Ukraine (Goldthau and Boersma, 2014; Pirani et al.,
2014), the policy challenges surrounding the transit of gas across
national boundaries regularly attract high-proﬁle political and
media attention. In part, this can be attributed to the complex
and contested nature of the relationships among infrastructure
investment, low-carbon transition and energy security at the glo-
bal scale. Social scientists are becoming increasingly involved in
attempts to shed further light on the internal workings of transna-
tional energy circulations, using an ever-expanding array of theo-
retical and methodological tools. Many discussions on the topic
focus on the rising number of policy actors and geometries seen
during the last decades, and the changing role of the state as a pro-
vider, regulator and owner of networked infrastructures. This hasbeen accompanied by a broader effort to interrogate the organiza-
tional and material aspects of socio-technical transitions, predi-
cated by an understanding of governance systems as ‘complex
and historically rooted ‘‘arenas’’ coevolving with the energy issues
they address’ (Cherp et al., 2011, p. 75).
The European gas sector provides particularly fertile ground for
such investigations, as a result of its economic and spatial idiosyn-
crasies. The European Union (hereafter EU) has been undertaking
far-reaching processes of economic and regulatory liberalization
aimed at creating common gas and electricity markets. More
recently, this has been supplemented by efforts to create an ‘en-
ergy union’, which involves, among other goals, ensuring the secu-
rity of supply and moving towards a low-carbon economy. Such
initiatives have been unfolding against the systemic transforma-
tion of state and corporate structures responsible for the produc-
tion, transmission, distribution and consumption of natural gas,
spanning a wide range of geographical realms. They have been
embedded in the speciﬁc material character of Europe’s energy
demand, resource endowment and geographical conﬁguration,
whereby a large volume of the continent’s natural gas needs have
to be met via overland gas pipelines.
1 Including 9 interviews with decision makers in various EU institutions and
national governments, 4 interviews with company representatives, and 2 interviews
with third sector organizations. The interviews lasted between 1 and 2 h. Intervie-
wees were selected so as to ensure the widest possible representation among relevant
decision-making bodies, and were approached initially via email. The professional
afﬁliation and personal identities of the interviewees are not disclosed in this paper
for ethical purposes, and most of them have not been directly cited in the paper due
to constraints on space.
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ated with the emergent geopolitical and economic reality created
by gas sector restructuring in the European Union are poorly
understood, especially when placed within the context of the
wider movement towards a low-carbon economy and society
(Bridge et al., 2013; Kama, 2014; Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011;
Shaffer, 2013). Adding a further layer of complexity is the
on-going global erosion of traditional state power, both towards
transnational organizations and in the direction of regional and
local actors. A burgeoning body of academic literature on the
meanings and practices of ‘territory’ has emphasized the exten-
sive spatial and political implications of the weakening of tradi-
tional forms of state authority (Agnew, 2005; Brenner, 2004;
Newman, 2013). Some of the key contributions to this ﬁeld have
focused on the increasingly ﬂuid and networked nature of terri-
tory, which can be organized around forces other than the state.
Painter (2010, p. 1090) in particular, has opened the space for
understanding territory as the outcome of ‘networked
socio-technical practices’ and ‘a product of relational networks’.
This kind of thinking has prompted Sassen (2013, p. 38) to claim
that some of the critical components of current territorial author-
ity are ‘no longer national in the strict sense of the term’ as they
function in a larger operational space that involves new dynamics
of debordering outside traditional state boundaries. Elsewhere,
the heuristic of ‘geopolitical economy’ has been put forward as
an entry point for challenging state-centric understandings of
the spatial implications of transnational power relations, market
transformation and capital ﬂows (Desai, 2013; Le Billon, 2004;
Sparke, 1998).
The now widely accepted notion that territory can be under-
stood as a ‘political technology’ (Elden, 2010) is mirrored in stud-
ies of large socio-technical systems, where a multiplicity of
theoretical perspectives have foregrounded the diverse agencies
involved in the construction and functioning of infrastructure net-
works (Anderson et al., 2012; Bailey and Maresh, 2009; Furlong,
2011). Yet thinking on energy infrastructures and territory rarely
communicate (although see Barry, 2013; Bridge et al., 2013); and
when it comes to territorially bounded systems such as the
European gas sector, these bodies of work have seldom entered
into a dialog with the expanding body of literature on
Europeanization as a multi-scalar territorial and ecological project
(Bialasiewicz et al., 2005; Jensen and Richardson, 2003; Moisio
et al., 2013).
In light of these lacunae and the policy context detailed above,
this paper focuses on the manner in which the transport of natural
gas across and within national boundaries allows for the rise of a
speciﬁc territorial assemblage beyond the traditional boundaries
of the nation state. The paper has three aims. First, we wish to
uncover how regulatory practices in this domain have been
historically embedded in the material geography of the European
gas sector, otherwise constituted by the hybrid landscape of
state authorities, corporate actors and transnational organizations
(van der Vleuten et al., 2013; Yaﬁmava, 2011). Second, and
drawing upon insights from network governance (Bulkeley, 2005)
and critical geopolitics (Dalby, 2010), we are interested in
interrogating the political and state structures that allow for the
emergence of a speciﬁc form of energy governance in the case of
overland gas transit. Third, the paper examines the spatial
conﬁgurations that reﬂect the ‘making of territory’ (Keating,
2013) via socio-technical assemblages. All three aims hinge upon
a conceptual approach that emphasizes the complex spatial and
political processes behind energy policy-making, so as to move
beyond one-dimensional analyses solely dedicated to markets or
‘the state’ as relevant actors (Bradshaw et al., 2014).
In addition to a survey of the academic literature, the evidence
presented in the paper is based on semi-structured ‘expert’interviews with key informants1 combined with a review of sec-
ondary documents, and social network analyses of contractual links
between state and corporate actors in the European gas sector
derived from ofﬁcially published reports. Given the methodological
advantages and shortcomings of social network analyses in the con-
text of energy circulations (Allen, 2011; De Graaff, 2012; Marres and
Rogers, 2008) these explorations serve to supplement the triangula-
tion of evidence rather than provide a central heuristic tool. The
paper commences with a theoretical interrogation of the relation-
ship between energy governance and territory, aimed at highlighting
the multiple existing and possible intersections of the two frame-
works as well as the need to move beyond the ‘states vs. markets’
debate in energy governance. This is followed by an examination
of the spatial and temporal underpinnings of natural gas develop-
ment in Europe. The paper then examines the production of a speci-
ﬁc pan-European natural gas transit assemblage thanks to (i) the
emergence of new regulatory and governance mechanisms (ii) spa-
tial connections that allow for the rise of transnational governance
networks of gas. The conclusion of the paper points to the manner
in which a new set of organizational and territorial relations are
altering the circulation of natural gas across the European geopolit-
ical and economic space, while challenging dominant understand-
ings of energy governance as they apply to this sector.2. The energy governance – territory nexus: disjointed,
polysemic, multi-scalar
Understanding the relationship between governance theories
and energy studies within in territorial and infrastructural contexts
that exceed the boundaries of the traditional nation state is com-
plicated by the absence of a commonly accepted deﬁnition of the
‘governance’ concept. In part, this can be attributed to the theoret-
ical pliancy of the term, which has been used to designate both the
nature and typology of governing actors, as well as the roles and
tasks that they undertake (Coutard, 2002). While some scholars
think of governance as the purposeful activities of social, political
or administrative bodies to ‘guide, steer, control or manage soci-
eties with authority’ (Seppo, 2004, p. 21) others emphasize the
importance of political work within the established ‘choice of rules’
(Buchanan, 1975) such as advocacy activities, lobbying and clien-
telism. Overall, the ascendancy of the governance heuristic reﬂects
the perceived increased role of civil society in inﬂuencing and
shaping relations of power, as well as the dwindling monopoly of
nation state governments in this domain. Also of relevance here
is the role of globalization processes, and changes in management
practice and theoretical knowledge brought about by the broader
conceptual movement towards a relational notion of government.
The multiple political and material dimensions of energy ﬂows
in society have regularly attracted the interest of governance
researchers (Kerebel and Keppler, 2009 provide an analysis of this
relationship in the European context; for a review of the strategic
rules surrounding oil governance see Mommer, 2000). One of the
key advantages of governance frameworks in this context lies, as
noted by Coutard (2002) in its ‘polysemic’ nature with respect to
analyses of large technical systems, including energy: both
broad-level political and economic issues can be covered within
the same framework, in addition to more speciﬁc questions
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Further supporting the wide functionality of the concept is its abil-
ity to encompass ‘the interactions between (the various forms and
levels of) governance of technological systems and societal gover-
nance patterns’ (Coutard, 2002, p. 2). At the same time, the gover-
nance register has allowed for notions of self-organization and
fragmented control to become incorporated in a networked under-
standing of the rise of ‘multi-actor system builders’ (ibid).
Governance paradigms have also been applied to the elucidation
of the multi-level ‘system of continuous negotiation among nested
governments at several territorial tiers – supranational, national,
regional and local’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2003, p. 234) operating
within the context of the European Union. Here, it is important
to emphasize that governance also has a reﬂective component,
since ‘thinking and acting with respect to an object of steering also
affects the subject and its ability to steer’ (Voss and Kemp, 2006, p.
2).
Network, multi-level, multi-scalar and reﬂexive governance
approaches have offered an elucidation of energy-related questions
in a wide range of thematic areas, including low-carbon transition,
cities and climate change (Anguelovski and Carmin, 2011; Bulkeley
and Castán Broto, 2013). Of crucial importance in the governance
of energy circulations are the inter-related questions of supply,
transit and demand in the context of the relationship between
security, scarcity and geopolitics. Debates over the security of
energy supply have mostly centred on oil and gas; some of the
work in this vein has emphasized that governments contribute to
the failures of market approaches by interfering in the market
operations in the name of national security (Dubash and Florini,
2011). The energy policies of India, China and Russia have come
under particular academic and practitioner scrutiny (Daojiong,
2006; Dubash, 2011; Kong, 2011; Locatelli, 2006; Phillips and
Newell, 2013; Zhao, 2013). It has been argued, for example, that
Russia’s rich resource endowment has been instrumentalized by
the state for the purpose of fostering nationalism (Bremmer and
Johnston, 2009; Domjan and Stone, 2010), while creating a partic-
ular identity around the ‘hydrocarbon superpower’ narrative
(Bouzarovski and Bassin, 2011). Russia’s ability to exercise political
inﬂuence in neighboring countries using its oil and gas exports
(Balzer, 2005; Feklyunina, 2012; Högselius, 2012; O’Lear, 2004)
has been frequently invoked in the context of discussions centring
on the complex web of multi-lateral agreements and institutional
arrangements supporting the European Union’s own energy
security-related policies (Belyi, 2003; Laurila, 2003; Leonard and
Popescu, 2007). The link between state sovereignty, identity and
energy has also been explored with relation to nuclear power
(Hecht, 2012, 1998; Jasanoff and Kim, 2009; Jones et al., 2013).
In this context, it is important to emphasize the close relation-
ship between the governance of global economic dynamics, on the
one hand, and the political and organizational aspects of infras-
tructure operation in the energy sector, on the other. As demon-
strated by the example of the WTO (Higgott and Erman, 2010),
any top-down attempts to strengthen the political and economic
underpinnings of global energy circulations inextricably raise
issues of legitimacy, accountability and transparency. Thus, prac-
tices of co-ordination and steering across different institutions
are inextricably linked to the political afﬁliations and motivations
that inform both individual and collective action in the energy
domain (Goldthau and Witte, 2009). But contemporary interpreta-
tions of the driving forces, relations and practices of power in the
governance of energy circulations display a distinct lack of coher-
ence. In part, this has been attributed to conceptualization of
energy governance in relation to separate energy sources (oil,
gas, coal, nuclear, renewables), socio-economic implications
(industrialization, productivity, efﬁciency, health, education, as
well as persistent local and global externalities) and scientiﬁcdisciplines (international relations, political science, institutional
economics). Despite the deep systemic interdependencies created
by energy ﬂows – as the lifeblood of the global economy – and
the multi-faceted nature of energy operations, policy activities
remain divided across different ‘arenas’ (Cherp et al., 2011). It
has been emphasized that policies in this domain need to move
beyond the traditional remit of the nation state in order to simul-
taneously tackle geopolitical issues revolving around the security
of supply, transit and demand, environmental externalities, eco-
nomic development policies including investment, as well as
resource management issues (ibid).
In addition to the sectoral fragmentation of relevant policies
and the undue primacy of the nation state, the relationship
between energy formations and governance concepts is further
complicated by the lack of a consensus over the institutional and
political approaches that accompany – in both positive and norma-
tive terms – ongoing economic and infrastructural transformations
of the global energy system. The main cleavage exists between
approaches that give centrality to security and geopolitical dimen-
sions, on the one hand, versus those that prioritize market rela-
tions and co-operation, on the other. Further complicating these
challenges is the continued domination of state power in some
resource sectors – a role that often becomes intertwined with
the expansion of nationalism and rentierism (Basedau and Lay,
2009; Okruhlik, 1999; Ross, 2012) – and geographic variations in
the ability of supra-national institutions to enforce coherent poli-
cies spanning multiple sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, there
is a growing realization within the literature that traditional forms
of government are insufﬁcient to address the complex systemic
issues associated with the emergence of new global hydrocarbon
markets, the convergence of energy security and climate change,
and the end of the era of ‘easy oil’.
The operation of transnational gas infrastructures in Europe
opens a unique window into the conceptual underpinnings of the
energy-governance-territory nexus. As highlighted in the introduc-
tion above, the development of energy policies within the
European Union provides powerful insights into the spatial embed-
dedness and articulation of large socio-technical systems. Research
focusing on this relationship has highlighted the ability of energy
infrastructures to project relations of power across entire cities,
regions and countries (Hughes, 1993; Marvin, 2012; Nye, 1999).
At the same time, geographers have made the point that territori-
alities operating at different scales and material sites constitute an
innate feature of energy systems (Bridge et al., 2013). The more
general literature on the subject has emphasized that territory
and territoriality per se are predicated upon the ‘mobilization of a
whole series of governmental technologies’ (Painter, 2010, p.
1105) which create ‘political machines’ (Barry, 2001) by combining
technical devices with institutionalized practices of measurement
and control (Elden, 2013; Murphy, 2013). Of no less importance
in this context is the proposition that regions are not physically
bounded entities, but rather exist at the intersection of multiple
economic and political networks (Allen and Cochrane, 2007;
Goodwin, 2012; Jessop, 2000).
Assemblage thinking is allowing for an interpretation of the
construction of space via the lens of more-than-human political
ecologies (Dittmer, 2013), where the agentic capabilities of infras-
tructural systems are articulated via their material properties
(Barry, 2001; Bennett, 2009; Meehan et al., 2013). Building on
Deleuze and Guattari (1988) and DeLanda (2006) has offered a
comprehensive operationalization of assemblage theories, by high-
lighting that such formations emerge out of the synergistic rela-
tionships among elements that can themselves exist as separate
entities. He has explored the processes that (de)stabilize assem-
blages via the expression of language, practices of coding, and
the embedding of spatial formations via processes of
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grate the inherently dynamic and multi-faceted nature of energy
systems has meant that such approaches have also served as a
basis for the study of low-carbon ‘experiments’ and transitions in
urban areas (Bulkeley et al., 2014; Rohracher and Späth, 2014;
Rutherford and Coutard, 2014). More broadly, the agentic capaci-
ties involved in the functioning of electricity grids have also been
studied with the aid of assemblage approaches (Bennett, 2005)
as have the driving forces of energy poverty (Harrison and Popke,
2011).
Intersections of governance and territory in the case of energy
ﬂows reveal a intricate and precarious socio-technical landscape,
in which spatial formations, development paths and trade links
underpin the relations between major corporate and market
actors. It is a constellation in which the unfolding of transna-
tional networks and practices of political power across space
directly shapes the course of market transactions and investment
decisions. But the governance mechanisms that underpin the
creation and performance of territorial relations remain unclear,
despite the widespread recognition that assemblages perform
political work. The functioning of the governance-territory nexus
is particularly unknown in the case of gas transit infrastructures,
which encompass hybrid networks that can span multiple
geographic realms (Bouzarovski, 2009, 2010; Johnson and
Derrick, 2012).3. Building the assemblage: spatial and temporal underpinnings
of natural gas expansion in Europe
The territorial implications of European gas governance are con-
tingent upon the historical development of infrastructures for the
production and transmission of this fuel, and the resulting spatial
distribution of its accompanying distribution activities. While the
evolution of gas in Europe in many ways follows the ‘three eras’
described by Evans and Farina (2013) – involving its initial exis-
tence as a manufactured gas product, onto conventional and
unconventional systems of provision – there are a number of
important spatial and technical speciﬁcities that have served as
drivers of the landscape that exists today.
Historically, the development of gas networks in the European
continent is rooted in the ‘town gas’ systems that were installed
in most major cities throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Produced from coking coal, gas in these socio-technical
systems was initially used for lighting, with heat and power uses
following much later. The European gas network developed in an
incremental and slow pace throughout the ﬁrst half of the twenti-
eth century, although the focus of production shifted from manu-
factured onto natural gas. This was mainly due to the use of
domestic reserves and the realization that this fuel often provided
a more secure, ﬂexible, reliable and more environmentally friendly
source of energy than either imported oil or coal. States like Italy,
France and Austria – which saw signiﬁcant gas ﬁnds both before
and after World War 2 – were at the forefront of such dynamics.
Alongside Romania and Galicia (a region shared between Poland
and Ukraine) these countries were the only parts of Europe that
saw the development of regional-level natural gas transmission
networks based on indigenous production (van der Vleuten et al.,
2013). Yet the resources available for the supply of their gas sys-
tems ‘were too limited for natural gas to become anything more
than a complementary energy source with dubious long-term pro-
spects’ (Högselius, 2012, p. 28).
It was only in early 1960s, thanks to the discovery of the
Groningen supergiant ﬁeld in northeastern Netherlands that major
political and economic actors started to think of Europe as resting
on ‘nearly limitless gas riches in its own ground’ (ibid: 29). Theconstruction of a pipeline from the Netherlands into the West
German industrial core in 1963 marked the beginnings of a
Europe-wide transmission system. It was followed by a rapid pro-
cess of gas supply expansion, whereby investment decisions and
technological advancements enabled the industry to grow well
beyond earlier expectations: gas production in the European
Union increased from 102 billion cubic meters (bcm) to 197 bcm
between 1970 and 1980 (Stevens, 2010). At the same time,
locally-based gas enterprises were gradually consolidated and aug-
mented into municipal, regional and national companies responsi-
ble for the construction and operation of high pressure
transmission networks, and the conversion of former low pressure
town gas networks into distribution systems from natural gas
(Stern, 2013).
The realization that Europe’s growing gas demand could not be
met through domestic sources alone helped fuel the growth of
trade relations with neighboring regions. First among these was
Algeria, where a supergiant gas ﬁeld was discovered already in
1956. This country’s foundation as an independent nation, as well
as its geographical and economic proximity to (then) growing
Southern European markets meant that it became an important
supplier of natural gas to countries such as France, Italy, Spain
and the United Kingdom (UK). The inclusion of the UK in the group
of initial Algerian markets is not accidental: Algerian gas was ini-
tially supplied to European states in the form of Liqueﬁed
Natural Gas (LNG), a technology that the UK had already utilized
in prior trade relations with the US. But various political, economic
and infrastructural obstacles meant that North African resources
started to play a signiﬁcant role in Europe’s gas supply only in
the late 1970s, thanks to the construction of a submarine pipeline
to Italy. This supply route saw further expansion in the 1990s and
2000s (Cronshaw et al., 2008).
The early 1960s were also marked by the beginning of the con-
struction of arguably Europe’s most signiﬁcant natural gas supply
corridor: the extensive network of import links with the former
Soviet space. The expansion of Soviet networks was seen as a major
development opportunity by Austrian, Italian and German gas
companies; it resulted in an agreement that allowed Austria to
connect to the Czechoslovak grid in 1968, in a deal that marked
the ﬁrst gas transmission agreement between Western and
Eastern Europe. Another signiﬁcant endeavor was the construction
of the dedicated ‘Yamal’ export pipeline, which commenced its
operations in 1984. It led to the doubling of Soviet gas exports to
Western Europe, despite attracting signiﬁcant opposition in the
United States.
The oil crises of the 1970s provided a major impetus towards
the rise of natural gas demand in Europe. Major gas ﬁnds in the
British, Danish, Dutch and Norwegian sectors of the North Sea
aided the development of a dense transmission grid in
Northwestern Europe. The rapid growth of this system contributed
to the creation of a distinctive supply regime, which van der
Vleuten et al. (2013) term ‘North Sea Europe’. Other than declining
indigenous UK and Dutch supplies, and the key role of Norway, one
of the main features of this ‘meso-region’ is the rising role of LNG
and the lack of an integrated grid among the Nordic countries, with
the exception of a single 30-in. pipeline between Sweden and
Denmark (see Fig. 1). Finland’s isolation from its Western neigh-
bors is a case in point – in European Union terms it represents a
‘gas island’ with only a single pipeline connection to Russia. As a
result, van der Vleuten et al. (2013) group this country alongside
the entirety of Eastern and Central Europe (including much of
Germany, Austria and Northeast Italy) and Greece in a second
gas region, termed ‘Eurasia’. In addition to being highly reliant on
Russia for its gas supplies – dependency ratios reach 100% in the
case of several Central and Southeastern European countries – this
realm is also characterized by the presence of a second set of gas
Fig. 1. Salient geographical features of the European gas sector. Source: ENTSOG.
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of the European Union’s gas grid (Fig. 1).
The same authors identify a third macro-gas region in Europe:
titled ‘Eurafrica’, it includes the south of France, the Iberian
Peninsula, and much of Italy. Alongside North African gas – and
associated concerns over stability and competitiveness – LNG plays
an important role in shaping supply mix of this part of Europe; a
total of 11 major LNG terminals can be found on the coasts of
Italy, Spain, Portugal and Southern France (Fig. 1). While emphasiz-
ing that the boundaries between ‘Eurafrica’, ‘Eurasia’ and ‘North Sea
Europe’ are approximate and ﬂuid, van der Vleuten et al. (2013) addthat they do not coincide with national borders: the territories of
major economies such as Germany, France and Italy all belong to
at least two regions. Moreover, the resource base of the European
gas sector extends well into Siberia and Africa, thus creating an
array of economic, political and infrastructural interdependencies
across a vast set of geographical realms. The resulting ‘hidden inte-
gration’ of Europe (Aalto and Korkmaz Temel, 2014;Misa and Schot,
2005) reveals the existence of a transnational socio-technical
assemblage that does not easily conform to preconceived historical
and political cleavages. As argued by van der Vleuten et al. (2013, p.
56), the complex political map of gas transmission in Europe points
Fig. 2. A network map of capacities and connections at cross-border gas transmission points in the EU and associated countries (cross-border points within the EU are marked
by white circles). Black circles represent non-EU import border points, and dark grey circles indicate LNG terminals. Darker lines indicate connections between EU countries
and non-EU gas transmission border points or LNG terminals. Source: ENTSOG.
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and cultural proximity, epistemic communities of trust, and eco-
nomic rationalities could be transformed by actors into convincing
arguments for building dependency-generating pipelines’ that
transgressed major geopolitical and physical barriers (also see
Bouzarovski and Konieczny, 2010).
The interconnectedness of the European energy landscape and
its resource dependency on neighboring geographical realms
become all the more visible when the European gas network is rep-
resented via a topological map that shows the connections between
different national transmission systems and the total capacities at
cross border points (Fig. 2). The post-communist countries of
Eastern and Central Europe (ECE) are particularly distinctive in this
regard – their systems are independently linked with the Russian
grid via hub and spoke conﬁguration. Under communism, this
infrastructural legacy was contingent upon a complex network of
bilateral trading relationships. Economic activities followed the
‘gas for manufactured goods’ principle, which meant that heavy
industry was developed based on Soviet oil and gas exchanged
via barter (Cronshaw et al., 2008). Similar to other energy resources,
gas ‘was considered as a central tool of the socialist economic pol-
icy, and was sold for a symbolic price’ (ibid: 18) across ECE.
The speciﬁcities of the post-Soviet socio-technical assemblage
have traditionally been a major cause of concern in Western
Europe, especially when placed in the context of broader geopolit-
ical relations in the Eurasian and North Atlantic realms (Adamson,
1985; Stern, 1982). In the early 1980s, for example, the West
German government set a 30% limit for Soviet gas supplies to the
country (Cronshaw et al., 2008). The growing gas dependency of
Western European states on Russian and other foreign imports
gave rise, inter alia, to the emergence of a ‘scarcity mentality’
(Stern, 2013) whereby gas was seen as a ‘premium fuel’ reserved
for high added value residential and commercial energy services,
instead of being burned in industrial boilers and power stations.
A depletion policy-based model of upstream gas governance thus
came to dominate European gas markets for several decades, but
was then abandoned by the UK in the early 1990s following priva-
tization. The ‘scarcity’ and ‘depletion’ approaches were reﬂected in
a range of regulatory decisions (particularly around licensing andpricing), while affecting the use of gas for power generation pur-
poses. They slowed down the expansion of gas across Europe,
while preventing trans-national market integration. However, anx-
ieties over the security of supply have continued to persist among
experts and the general public alike (European Commission,
2014a). This is despite the fact that the dissolution of the Soviet
Union was not associated with major supply interruptions, other
than the consequences of the Russia-Ukraine gas crises during
the winters of 2006 and 2009, and concerns over the military con-
ﬂict in 2014 and 2015.
4. Governing the assemblage: EU policies and the ‘common
energy market’
While the recent establishment of the ‘Energy Union’ offers a
high proﬁle demonstration of the regulatory and policy architec-
ture involved in governing the European gas sector, it should be
noted that most of the elements of this framework have already
been in place for at least a decade. EU governance in the natural
gas domain has involved three principal approaches: the commu-
nity model (compliance and rule-based multilateralism), the part-
nership model (intergovernmentalism) and bilateral diplomacy
(Padgett, 2011). In the intergovernmental gas governance domain,
these strategies have involved limiting the scope of EU compe-
tences via, in particular, opt-outs and arrangements that have
allowed certain member states to pursue closer integration, while
implementing gradual liberalization and multiple models of com-
pliance (Andersen and Sitter, 2015). At the same time, the EU has
promoted consensual decision-making with the aid of organiza-
tions such as the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy
Regulators (ACER), established in 2011 and replacing the
European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas. There has also
been efforts to shape the power, preferences and strategies of the
European Commission in domains such as decision-maker appoint-
ments and consultations on policy initiatives, while allowing for
the parallel operation of state authority in particular energy policy
realms. The latter have included the ability to determine the com-
position of energy supply, the extraction of natural resources, and
the nature of new infrastructure investment.
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ment of intergovernmental policy tools in the gas transmission
domain was also conﬁrmed by two of our interviewees in the
European Commission. Their statements highlighted the stabiliza-
tion of the overland gas transit assemblage via a set of shared inter-
ests and beliefs, which are not always expressed in ofﬁcial
documents and regulatory acts. It was underlined that:
In most cases there is a common denominator between member
states . . . [A] very important basis for our policy is the develop-
ment of the internal market for gas and electricity. It has led to
creating competencies at EU level and some common standards
which have to be implemented by EU member states. For the
large supplier countries it is a very important basis for develop-
ing a policy. A second [key] basis is the security of supply,
where all or most member states have a common interest in
terms of gas. There is an obligation in the EU treaty to
co-operate on security of supply aspects . . . the Commission
acts as a facilitator in this regard.
[(Personal communication, 2012)]
Indeed, the suggestion that gas security in Europe cannot be
guaranteed by national-level policies was present in the statements
of most of the decision-makers interviewed for the purposes of this
study. Some of them recognized the existence of the ‘meso-regions’
suggested by (van der Vleuten et al., 2013), while pointing out the
signiﬁcant infrastructure growth prospects in Southeastern
Europe in particular. This is further conﬁrmed by a policy document
developed at the request of the European Parliament’s Committee
on Industry, Research and Energy (Bjørnmose et al., 2009). It identi-
ﬁes four clear overland gas import corridors into the EU: northeast-
ern (from Russia, supplying approximately 23% of consumption),
northwestern (from Norway, accounting for ca. 18% of consump-
tion), southwestern (via the Mediterranean, responsible for 10% of
consumption) and southeastern (from Turkey and the Black sea).
The report sees the latter pathway (elsewhere this has been
described as the ‘Southern’ corridor) as offering themost signiﬁcant
opportunities for diversifying Europe’s gas supply prospects and
opening new markets.2 One of our interviewees, however, ques-
tioned the extent to which a corridor deriving gas from Azerbaijan,
Central Asia or the Middle East and using Turkey as a transit hub
would necessarily bring greater levels of energy security to the EU
itself – especially given Russia’s increasing interest in this corridor.
The EU’s increased involvement in transnational gas governance
has been underpinned by a series of speciﬁc policy measures aimed
at, in effect, establishing a common code for the functioning of the
gas transmission assemblage. These have mainly been contingent
upon the liberalization of the gas sector and the creation of a ‘com-
mon energy market’ via an incremental process that has been
underway during the past two decades (for a further discussion
see Maltby, 2013). In an effort largely led by the European
Commission, a series of directives were implemented during the
1990s and 2000s, allowing for the separation and ‘ownership
unbundling’ of trading, transportation and distribution activities,
as well as the creation of independent regulatory bodies. The pro-
visions of the Third Energy Package, adopted in 2009, have been of
particular importance in this context. They involve two directives
and three regulations for the ‘common internal markets’ in elec-
tricity and gas. Overall, the declared objective of these legislative
acts is to provide for ‘competitive and integrated energy markets’
that allow ‘European consumers to choose between different sup-
pliers and all suppliers, irrespective of their size, to access the mar-
ket’ (European Commission, 2014b).2 Our use of the terms ‘state’ and ‘market’ is broad and comprises a combination of
formal institutional structures, forms of socio-political organization and relations of
power, along the work of authors such as Strange (1998).The Third Energy Package has allowed for the emergence of a
distinctive set of steering practices, rules and regulations for the
at the scale of the EU. This governance framework functions across
a number of spheres, from the development and implementation of
ofﬁcial policy documents, to the day-to-day operation of material
infrastructures such as pipelines, pumping stations and storage
facilities. It has been underpinned by the formulation of, princi-
pally, ﬁve types of technical and regulatory instruments: (i) codes
for the balancing of transmission networks; (ii) capacity allocation
mechanisms; (iii) congestion management procedures; (iv) inter-
operability rules; and (v) framework guidelines for tariffs.
Institutionally, such measures have been articulated via the
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas
(ENTSOG) and ACER, in addition to associated bodies with a more
general remit, such as the Energy Community. The arrangements
developed by these bodies extend over and above the activities
of national regulators and utility companies. While a detailed dis-
cussion of such technical and regulatory frameworks would exceed
the aims and scope of this paper, it is worth pointing out that they
constitute the grain that allows for the functioning of the European
natural gas transmission network. They are, in effect, the codes and
convention that have allowed for consolidating the gas transmis-
sion assemblage (DeLanda, 2006).
Evidence from our background interviews indicated that the
ownership unbundling process constitutes the central cog in the
wheel that drives the establishment of a distinct European gas
transmission landscape. Three aspects are of particular importance
in this context: (i) the creation of a regime in which transmission
sector operators (TSOs) are lifted out of national decision-making
spheres by becoming regulated monopolies that are not always
owned by the state (Stern, 2013); (ii) the establishment of formally
independent regulatory bodies that can act as unitary players in
building linkages across national boundaries; and (iii) the removal
of pipeline ownership from vertically integrated energy compa-
nies, thus allowing for the entrance of transnational corporate
actors into the transmission sector. As a result of such processes,
the overland transport of gas in Europe has become a material
and institutional nexus for the interaction among private enter-
prise and the state at multiple scales of activity.
The European Union’s activities in drafting the Third Energy
Package have been accompanied by a wider framework of policies
in the energy security domain. This is leading to the emergence of a
multi-lateral energy governance regime, involving a pan-European
energy policy that conveys normative principles, fosters energy lib-
eralization and provides for reciprocity with key strategic political
and energy partners (Westphal, 2006). But our interviews indi-
cated that market-based governance is projected by the EU onto
the international arena despite the fact that member states are
internally divided on liberalization reforms, and levels of success
in implementing the Third Energy Package have been varied
(Boussena and Locatelli, 2013). When combined with the lack of
physical interconnections as a result of the historical legacies high-
lighted in Section 2, this situation limits the EU’s ability to formu-
late an uniﬁed response to external energy challenges. Thus, the
wider geopolitical and material context of EU energy policy is a
constant destabilizing force for the gas transmission assemblage:
it offers alternative modes for the organization of its constituent
parts while undermining the effectiveness of the political and insti-
tutional consensus that drives its functioning.5. Territorializing the assemblage: new spatial formations in the
gas transit landscape
The operation of the gas transmission assemblage via the gover-
nance practices described above is starting to affect the material
Fig. 3. Relations among gas TSOs and state regulators at the entry points of natural gas pipelines into the EU. Line thickness indicates number of connections. Exporters are
marked in medium grey, importers in light grey, regulators in dark grey. Circle size indicates number of institutional connections at the cross-border transmission points.
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tures and socio-technical legacies have combined with the estab-
lishment of new codes and regulatory arrangements to create an
emergent set of spatial distribution patterns and territorializations
of gas transmission activities. Thus, an analysis of the institutional
links between energy regulators and TSOs at the import entry
points of natural gas in the European Union highlighted the exis-
tence of ﬁve separate spatially-embedded transnational clusters
(Fig. 3). The largest three of these centre on the Norwegian
(Gassco), Russian (Gazprom) and Ukrainian (Ukrtranzgas) TSOs,
with the German regulator (BNetzA) playing an important role in
the former due to, in part, the physical centrality of the German
gas network in Western Europe. This emergent web of institutional
afﬁliations and links challenges the traditional division of the
European gas sector into three meso-regions (described in
Section 3) while indicating the infrastructural difﬁculties associ-
ated with building a materially integrated gas market in the EU
(Fig. 3).
Also contributing to the spatial and territorial distribution of
gas transmission activities has been the decline of oil-indexed
long-term contracts (LTCs) – traditionally the main method of sup-
plying gas to European markets. The decrease of oil-indexation and
LTCs is not only the result of the liberalization and integration of
gas markets; the ‘virtual elimination of oil products from manystationary energy sectors in these markets’ (Stern and Rogers,
2011, p. 2) has also played a key role, in addition to the changing
risk ownership structure in the gas value chain, in ‘which
back-to-back selling at oil-linked prices is difﬁcult’ (DNV KEMA
Energy and Sustainability, 2013, p. 23). Such developments have
precipitated the rise of wholesale gas spot and forward markets,
creating a situation whereby midstream importing and wholesale
companies have been ‘squeezed between gas bought upstream at
oil-linked prices and gas sold downstream based on wholesale
market prices’ (ibid).
One of the consequences of the decline of LTCs has been the rise
of a network of ‘gas hubs’, along the lines of the North American
market model. This process commenced in the UK, with the estab-
lishment of the ‘National Balancing Point’ (NBP) as a virtual loca-
tion where shippers can nominate their buys and sells, and
where the National Grid can equalize the system on a daily basis
(Heather, 2010). Although the NBP is still the dominant hub in
the European network – and has international signiﬁcance as the
provider of benchmark pricing – its preeminence is increasingly
challenged by the Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF), which func-
tions on a similar basis. Also of importance are the Zeebrugge
hub (ZTP) in Belgium and the Central European Gas Hub (CEGH)
in Austria. Unlike NCG and TTF, these hubs are nested in particular
geographical locations, where large ﬂows of gas enter the two
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tions). They thus serve as transportation entry points for large
quantities of gas to, respectively, neighboring Western and
Central European countries (Heather, 2012). Yet the advantages
of geography have also constrained the growth of the two hubs,
as they remain dependent on the physical volumes of gas transit-
ing through them. Also of note is the Gaspool physical hub in
Germany, as well as a number of smaller virtual hubs:
NetConnect Germany (NCG), the three Points d’Echange de Gaz
(PGZ) in France, Italy’s Punto di Scambio Virtuale (PSV), as well
as the emergent hubs in Spain, Ireland, Hungary, Poland, and the
Czech Republic. It should be noted that despite not being materi-
ally manifested in a given place, all of the hubs are associated with
distinctive geographical territories, which are not necessarily con-
terminous with the borders of nation states (see Fig. 4).
Gas hubs are playing an increasing role as an instrument for the
exchange of natural gas in European markets. In the ﬁrst half of
2013, three of the continental hubs – TTF, Gaspool, and NCG –
saw double-digit growth in traded volumes (27%, 23%, 22%, respec-
tively) relative to the ﬁrst half of 2012. The physically volume of
gas within all EU hubs rose by 5% across the board, with
Zeebrugge, Gaspool and NCG seeing the largest expansions, at
48%, 14% and 13%, respectively (Market Observatory for Energy,
2013). The success of the gas hub model, with its associated
increase in levels of energy independence, market integration
and prices, have prompted countries across Europe – andFig. 4. Territories covered by the various Europeaespecially those in the East – to ponder the development of their
own systems of this kind. One of our corporate interviewees, how-
ever was skeptical about their future development:
‘Establishing a gas hub is a complex infrastructural and ﬁnancial
undertaking. In Europe, most gas hubs developed to meet bal-
ancing need . . . only after a certain degree of liquidity and price
reliability were they able to offer an additional pathway for gas
supply as an alternative to long term contracts and oil indexa-
tion. The biggest problem in Eastern Europe is that you need a
large market to sell the gas to, a variety of commercial players,
and preferably a connection to an LNG terminals rather than
just pipelines’.
[(Personal communication, 2013)]
Overall, the restructuring of the European gas markets has
added a new layer of complexity and diversity to an already
multi-faceted transmission landscape. The organizational richness
of this assemblage becomes even more evident when contractual
relationships among transmission system operators at
cross-border trading points are analyzed using network mapping
techniques (Fig. 5). In addition to the dense institutional linkages
surrounding the two major mid-stream exporters to the EU (the
Russian Gazprom and Norwegian Gassco), the map also reveals
the existence of a weaker set of relations in the Mediterranean,
focused on the imports of Algerian gas. The existence of ‘gas
islands’ in Eastern Europe is also highlighted in the form ofn hubs. Source: ENTSOG and Heather (2012).
Fig. 5. Relations among gas TSOs at the entry and exit points of natural gas in the EU. Line thickness indicates number of connections. Shading indicates level of diffusion
(more diffuse networks are darker). Circle size indicates cross-border transmission capacity associated with the given company. Source: ENTSOG.
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the Balkans and the Baltic States. Also evident is the crucial role
of the Nord Stream pipeline in helping bridge the transmission
gap between the Gazprom and Gassco systems. Arguably, this link
plays one of the most important roles towards the creation of a
uniﬁed European network.
The network analyses also highlight the key role that a limited
set of companies – GDF Suez, Gasunie, EON, Wintershall, Fluxys
and OpenGridEurope – play in facilitating transmission connec-
tions across the continent. This reﬂects ﬁndings by Stern (2013),
who identiﬁes these stakeholders, in addition to RWE, Enel,
Endesa, Iberdrola and Vattenfall as being the main owners of a
variety of gas assets across a number of European countries, thanks
to a number of relatively recent mergers and acquisitions. It is
worth noting that the foundation of most of these corporate enti-
ties lies in the electricity sector, which allows them to dominate
the utility landscape as a whole. Thus, while the territorialization
of the gas transmission assemblage has yet to produce spatial pat-
terns of activity that would radically transform the existing
geographies of gas circulation in Europe, there are indications that
a new set of economic relations and interdependencies is creating
a landscape in which traditional actors – state actors and regulated
monopolies within national boundaries – are taking a back seat in
favor of legally ‘unbundled’ transmission owners dominated by
transnational companies.
6. Conclusion
This paper has focused on the governance practices and net-
works that accompany the emergence of a large scale infrastruc-
ture system for the overland transmission of natural gas in
Europe. We have argued that this process has involved the stabi-
lization of a speciﬁc socio-technical assemblage encompassingvariety of institutional actors and material sites. Going back to
our ﬁrst aim (regarding the historical embeddedness of gas net-
works in the European energy landscape), we can conclude that
this was an incremental ‘process through which larger entities
emerged from the assembly of smaller ones’ (DeLanda, 2006, p.
18). Moreover, the assemblage transmits relations of political
power, while acting as a conduit for the articulation of economic
links and interdependencies. Its features are aligned with the
dynamic understanding of territory advanced by authors like
Paasi (2003), who emphasize the amalgamation of land, power
and functionality in the emergence of these formations. The fact
that the European gas network involves a range of material, perfor-
mative and symbolic dimensions also implies that it serves a par-
ticular territorial role vis-à-vis the political articulation of EU
energy security, integration and neighborhood policies.
In terms of the second aim of the paper (on the ‘coding’ of the
assemblage via practices of gas governance), there is evidence to
suggest that the effective functioning of this system has required
the enrolment of a variety of human and non-human actants.
Large transnational corporations are becoming increasingly impor-
tant here, often overtaking and replacing the actions of the nation
state. This is facilitated by the gradual emergence of a common EU
energy market, which is otherwise supported via a wide range of
formal and informal steering mechanisms. The declining impor-
tance of long-term contracts and oil indexation both underpin
and express such dynamics. Overall – and in response to the third
aim of the paper – it can be concluded that their territorial opera-
tion favors the growing emphasis on market mechanisms within
the literature on energy governance, as opposed to the more tradi-
tional focus on state policy and geopolitical relations. It also high-
lights the need for a more inclusive understanding of the spatial
contingencies that allow such processes to occur, as well as the
manner in which background policies and actions at the
S. Bouzarovski et al. / Geoforum 64 (2015) 217–228 227transnational scale shape the development of large scale infras-
tructure systems.
The territorial architecture that is being produced by the
socio-technical system for European gas transmission has several
distinctive features, whose further exploration may beneﬁt wider
understandings of the role of infrastructure in producing such sys-
tems. There are important synergies here with research on infras-
tructure more generally (Star, 1999). The gas transmission system,
for example, has increased incrementally from the bottom up – lar-
gely through private sector investment – while including a variety
of spatial formations with their own geographies. The presence of
isolates, hubs and highly interconnected spaces points to the emer-
gence of a speciﬁc new landscape of geographical inclusion and
exclusion. In addition to being spatially diffuse, the physical
boundaries of this space are highly interconnected with neighbor-
ing spaces, while being materially embedded in wider
socio-technical systems for the provision of energy. They are
increasingly run in a manner that extends beyond the traditional
domains of governance, involving transnational actors that do
not easily lend themselves to conventional accountability mecha-
nisms. As such, they offer fertile ground for expanding the theoret-
ical lens of energy governance into examinations of the
socio-technical assemblages associated with non-state actors.
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